Often an information source on the Web would like to provide di erent classes of service to di erent clients. In the autonomous, highly distributed world of the Web, the traditional approach of using authentication to di erentiate between classes of clients is no longer su cient, as knowledge of a client's identity will often not su ce to determine whether a client is authorized to use a service. Our goal in this research project is to explore the use of digital credentials, digital analogues of the paper credentials we carry in our wallets today, to help solve this problem. In this paper we describe the major features required of a Web environment deploying digital credentials, including the introduction of security assistants for both clients and servers, and report on the status of our investigation into a credential-based environment.
Introduction
Many Internet information sources would like to provide di erent classes of service to di erent users. For example, perhaps some services are not to be made available to residents of Texas, or to minors. How can a client prove to the information source that it is eligible for the service it would like to use? 1 Traditionally, it has been thought that authentication facilities provide the answer to this problem. Authentication allows a service to verify the identity of a client, and some Internet startup companies have focused on the introduction of good authentication facilities for the Web. But knowing the identity of a client is not enough to ensure that the client is over 21 or does not live in Texas|in fact, the client's exact identity is irrelevant in these cases, and the client might be reluctant to divulge its identity for privacy reasons.
Another option is to require preregistration of potential clients of a service. However, this runs counter to the spirit of many Web-based services, where clients often enter a small service request on the spur of the moment. Mandatory preregistration might reduce the potential client base for a service.
For example, for a time the o cers of ACM SIGMOD wished to restrict the on-line version of the SIGMOD Record so that only members of SIGMOD would be able to read the articles in the Record. How to carry this out? Current browser technology would allow the Record Web site to store a list of names and passwords of all SIGMOD members. However, this would be a huge administrative headache for the volunteer administrators of the Record site. It would be di cult to obtain up-to-date on-line lists of SIGMOD members from ACM. There would be no easy way to inform SIGMOD members of their passwords. Changes in membership and passwords would be an 1 In this paper we use the term`client' to refer to the human controlling a Web browser, as well as the browser itself.
additional burden. In addition, as the computer powering the site is small and low on disk space, its owners might object to the presence of large les of administrative information.
As an additional drawback, by supplying the site with his or her exact name each time they came to browse, a SIGMOD member would be divulging information that was not really relevant for the site's access control decision: all that was important was the fact that the visitor was a member of SIGMOD, not the visitor's exact identity. From a privacy point of view, the visitor should only need to prove SIGMOD membership, not his or her identity. While a visitor to the Record site might not mind divulging his or her identity, for many other sites on the Web the visitor would be well advised to be more cautious. A site might choose to sell the visitor's identity, along with details of the visitor's actions at the site, to marketing database companies. Without additional legal restrictions not currently in place in the US, there is no way to prevent a server who has seen a digital credential from sharing the information contained in it with others. Besides the annoyance of being on the receiving end of a maelstrom of marketing information, visitors might have good reason to wish to keep their visit private; for example, a visitor searching for information on a serious disease might not want potential employers or insurers to suspect that the visitor had that disease.
One potential solution to the privacy problem, also within the reach of current browser technology, is to have a shared`name' and password for every SIGMOD member. However, this would provide little protection for the information on the site, as former members of SIGMOD would still be able to gain access, and there would be few repercussions for sharing the SIGMOD password with others. Even without shared passwords, the use of passwords is notoriously ine ective for preventing unauthorized access, and should be avoided if the information at the site is truly sensitive.
Perhaps, then, more modern technology provides a solution to the problem: why not use the SSL authentication facilities built into most SIGMOD members' browsers? With this approach, the browser can transparently prove to the site that the visitor possesses a certain browser-speci c identity. In addition, SSL's authentication approach will provide much more security than simple passwords. Unfortunately, the identity by which the browser is known will not be the identity by which the visitor is known to SIGMOD. In fact, the visitor's identity will be di erent with each di erent browser the visitor uses. Thus this approach will also require a (possibly insecure) on-line or o -line preregistration step, and will incur administrative headaches in keeping track of the relationship between members and browsers. Further, the visitor will have to divulge his or her browser's identity, which from an abstract point of view is irrelevant for making an access control decision and may raise privacy concerns. The smart cards that will become common in the next decade or so will allow a user to carry the same identity with him or her as the user moves from browser to browser, but will not alleviate the privacy concerns discussed above.
To overcome these problems, we have been investigating the use of digital credentials, which may be thought of as on-line analogues to the paper credentials that people carry in their wallets. For example, a digital version of an ACM SIGMOD membership card can be used to gain access to the Record on line. These credentials can be issued (typically o -line) by the same kinds of authorities as issue paper credentials today|voter registrars, driver's license facilities, schools, employers, hospitals, etc. The credentials can be submitted along with a request for service to prove that the client has the particular properties required by the service provider of its clients. Using modern encryption technology, digital credentials can be made unforgeable and veri able, e.g., in the manner used for today's X.509 or PKCS certi cates 12, 9] or the newly-introduced Verisign certi cate product (http://digitalid.verisign.com/). For example, ACM can digitally sign the credential that says that a certain ACM member (identi ed by his or her membership number) belongs to ACM.
With careful design of a user interface, the client can control to whom its credentials are shown, without having to attach the relevant credentials manually to every service request.
The introduction of digital credentials brings with it a host of new data management problems. The applications running at Web servers, embodied in CGI scripts (for brevity, we will refer to these applications and scripts as servers), must have policies on which credentials are required for which services. In the real world, such policies are likely to be quite complex, raising information management issues. For example, even the simple SIGMOD Record site will probably choose to grant di erent levels of access to SIGMOD members, ACM members, joint IEEE-ACM members, and the general public. In addition, servers must have a means of communicating their policies to clients, so that clients can obtain and attach appropriate credentials to requests. Clients must be able to understand policies and choose from among their credentials those best suited to the current request; clients will in general be unwilling to show all their credentials to just any server. For example, a user should be able to tell his or her browser to attach an ACM SIGMOD membership credential to every request sent to the SIGMOD Record Web site, but not to send it with any other request. To perform all these tasks, clients and servers need automated assistance. Our research project (http://drl.cs.uiuc.edu/security) is focusing on the design and development of a personal security assistant for clients and a server security assistant for servers.
The Personal Security Assistant
The central task of the personal security assistant (PSA) is to manage a client's credentials in accordance with the stated policies of the client. The PSA helps the client obtain credentials, stores them locally, attaches them to service requests in accordance with the policies established by the client, determines what credentials are needed for a particular service request, and communicates as needed with the client while carrying out its assigned tasks.
For example, consider the case of ACM credentials. A paper ACM credential includes the name of the issuing organization (ACM), the identity by which the credential owner is known to ACM (a membership number), the class of membership (e.g., voting, student, joint, institutional), an expiration date, and a common name for the owner (e.g., Sue Smith). Consider a digital version of the ACM credential that includes exactly this information. The credential would be digitally signed by ACM, making it unforgeable and veri able; anyone could obtain ACM's public key (from a trusted source), decrypt the credential, verify that its contents were uncorrupted (using a message digest or other standard techniques), and then conclude that the credential was issued by an entity that knew ACM's private key, which presumably is known only to ACM itself. The credential contents (identity, membership class, etc.) will be arranged either in a standard format whose description is available on request from ACM, or else in a self-describing data structure; either way, the contents will be machine parsable, and a server receiving such a credential should be able to determine that a certain identity is a member of ACM.
The digital version of an ACM credential need not exactly mimic the paper credential's contents. For example, the digital version could omit the common name of its bearer. The common name is present in paper credentials largely for two reasons: humans do not like being identi ed as numbers, a prejudice not shared by computers; and the common name allows a bearer to prove that he or she is the same individual mentioned in the credential. For example, Sue can show her ACM membership card along with an ID bearing the same common name and a photo or an example signature. Sue then proves that she is the identity mentioned in the ACM credential by showing her face or by reproducing her signature then and there. However, the common name need not be used in authentication if digital credentials are used; instead, ACM can associate a public/private key pair with each membership number, and make the public keys available (e.g., by including them in issued credentials). Sue can prove that she is the person mentioned in her digital ACM credential by proving knowledge of the private key associated with her ACM credential, using standard authentication techniques. Thus her ACM credential need only identify her by a local name that is meaningful within the context of ACM. This greatly enhances the potential for privacy with the use of digital credentials, as servers need not learn any name by which their clients are widely known (e.g., common name or social security number). However, if a server is shown credentials identifying the client by two di erent identities, the server will learn that the client possesses those two identities, a fact that could eventually be used to reach conclusions about the exact identity of the client. Thus the ease with which local names can be used with digital credentials does not provide any absolute privacy guarantees.
As mentioned earlier, once a server has received and parsed Sue's ACM credential, nothing prevents the server from promulgating the contents of the credential to others. To reduce this risk, as well as other risks of doing business on the Web, Sue might choose to show her credentials only to servers that themselves possess certain credentials, akin to a Better Business Bureau stamp of approval. This approach can also lessen the chance of Sue interacting with a server that is not at all what it claims to be (e.g., a fake ACM SIGMOD site developed for the purpose of collecting identities of ACM members). Although this possibility is not discussed further in this paper, all of the machinery we develop for the case of clients presenting credentials to servers is also relevant for the reverse scenario, in which servers attempt to woo clients by presenting their own credentials to potential clients. Figure 1 shows the ow of an example request through a PSA and a server security assistant. Since servers tend to be overburdened central resources, the tasks associated with managing digital credentials should be o oaded to clients as much as possible. This means that clients and their assistants will be responsible for obtaining the appropriate credentials for a particular request and submitting them to the server along with the request; the PSA will also store the credentials locally for future use. For example, Sue's PSA may assist her with the task of obtaining an ACM credential; however, most likely the ACM credential issuer will be located o line, as it may be an attractive target for attack. In any case, the issued ACM credential and any associated information (passwords, private keys, credential data format, credential signature algorithm, etc.) will be stored at the PSA, to be exhibited to servers when Sue gives permission to do so. To help it reason about the credentials its client possesses, and hence which services the client will be eligible for, the PSA also translates the contents of newly-acquired credentials into an internal format and stores these translations in a local knowledge base. Thus the PSA will know, in the shallow sense of the word, that Sue has a credential issued by the ACM, with a certain membership number, with a certain expiration date, and so on. The PSA's knowledge base will tend to grow over time, as expired credentials may be needed for certain purposes. For example, the IRS may challenge Sue to prove that she really was an ACM member in 1990, the year she took a deduction for professional dues on her tax return.
The PSA must also be able to determine what credentials are required for each service request; this may require an extra round of communication with the server, which should be carried out automatically without the intervention of the client. The server's explanation of its policy on what credentials are required must be o ered in a standard language that the assistant can understand, with clear semantics, so that the PSA can reason about the credentials possessed by its client and how they match the server policy, in the same way that the server would do. This is most easily accomplished if credential contents are translated into the same standard language used for expressing policies, and if a standard semantics is used for that language. For example, one approach to export of policies is to use a dialect of the standard knowledge interchange format KIF 7] .
As an example policy, the Record's server may require proof of ACM SIGMOD membership for clients that wish to read the text of Record articles. Article abstracts, however, may be available to all ACM members as well as SIGMOD members. SIGMOD conference attendees may have special privileges for viewing the June issue of the Record, which contains the conference proceedings. And joint ACM-IEEE members may be required to prove that they actually are IEEE members before they will be accorded the privileges normally associated with ACM membership. Thus even for the small example of the Record, the server's policy is relatively complex, and a PSA will need to be able to reason about it just as the server would.
Easy policy and credential interchange also requires conventions about the representations used for common categories of information; for example, while Sue's PSA will be able to determine that her ACM membership class is`voting', the PSA may
Given an understanding of what credentials could be used to satisfy a particular request, it remains to choose the set of credentials actually submitted. As a compromise between ease of use and privacy, the best approach is for the client to give the PSA a policy on credential submission. As it would be too inconvenient for the user to specify a separate policy for each individual service request, the policy should assign service requests to categories. For each category, the policy then tells which credentials can be freely distributed and which should never be given out without explicit permission. For example, all URLs belonging to the Record site may be lumped together into one category in Sue's credential submission policy. She may specify that her ACM membership credential and her SIGMOD credential can be attached to any service request going to the Record site, if the particular request requires either of those credentials. Sue's PSA should obtain a copy of the Record's credential acceptance policy, and when she asks to look at an article abstract, the PSA should automatically attach either her ACM or SIGMOD credential to the request. When she asks to look at the full text of an article, the PSA should automatically attach her SIGMOD credential to the request. If Sue goes to a di erent site, say the main ACM site, and requests a document which according to the ACM server's policy is only available to ACM members, Sue's PSA should pop up a dialog box asking permission to attach her ACM credential to the request, and giving her the option of turning that permission (or denial) into a permanent part of her credential submission policy.
A server's credential acceptance policy will describe in general terms what credentials the server is willing to accept for what kinds of requests, rather than spelling out exactly what the client can or should submit for the current request. For example, suppose that the Record's server has recently changed its policy; formerly, joint ACM-IEEE members did not have to show proof of membership to gain access to Record abstracts. If Ann's PSA still has the old policy, it might automatically attach her joint ACM membership credential to a request for an abstract, but without her IEEE credential. Rather than requesting the missing IEEE credential, the server would return a copy of the current policy. The PSA must reason with the server's policy, the client's submission policy, and the set of credentials currently on hand to determine what set of credentials, if any, should actually be submitted. In other words, it will be up to the PSA to determine that an IEEE credential must accompany Ann's joint ACM membership credential, and to check whether Ann permits the IEEE credential to be shown to the Record site. This reasoning must be conducted relatively quickly, as mentioned above, as the human client will be waiting while it is carried out.
The Server Security Assistant
The security-related functions of a server can be encapsulated into a server security assistant (SSA), also shown in Figure 1 . The server security assistant shares some of the functions of a PSA. For example, the SSA must be able to reason about sets of credentials and credential acceptance policies. The SSA must also be able to export portions of its credential acceptance policy to clients who ask for explanations of its server's security policy. In addition, the SSA must have some understanding of the di erent services provided by its server and the di erent privileges that a client might possess when accessing those services 1, 10, 11].
To simplify the speci cation of which users have which privileges, software systems often divide users into groups and specify privileges on a per-group basis. In the case of a Web site, the identity of clients will not be known in advance in most cases, making it imperative to describe privileges in a manner independent of client identity. One approach is to describe the privileges associated with particular sets of credentials that a client might present to an SSA. As descriptions in terms of explicit sets of credentials may become lengthy and complex, it will be convenient for the SSA's policy to bundle together all combinations of credentials that would accord a client the same privileges, i.e., an equivalence class of credentials. The SSA's policy can specify which credentials entitle a client to belong to which equivalence class(es), and privileges can be de ned for each equivalence class. We call each of these equivalence classes a role.
A role indicates in which capacity the client is acting, and the response to a request may be di erent, depending on the role (rather than the identity) of the client who is making the request. For example, when accessing the American Airlines reservation site, visitors may be classi ed into the roles of non-frequent iers, frequent iers, gold iers, and platinum iers, and accorded di erent service based on their frequent ier status. If Sue presents her gold frequent ier status credential to American Airlines, the reservation system may allow her to choose a special meal at reservation time, a service only available to gold and platinum iers. After parsing, verifying the authenticity of, and translating the credentials submitted with a request, the SSA must match the credential information against its server's acceptance policy, to determine the roles that the client can assume for the current request. For example, if Sue's PSA submits her SIGMOD membership credential along with a request to the Record site, Sue will be assigned to the role that has full privileges to look at everything on the site. If the PSA submits her SIGMOD credential to American Airlines, Sue will probably be classi ed as a non-frequent ier, since SIGMOD membership accords no special privileges with American Airlines.
Intuitively, Sue's SIGMOD membership also quali es her for other roles at the Record site. For example, she also quali es for the role that requires no credentials at all, the`general-public' role. Such visitors might be permitted to browse tables of contents, but be denied access to abstracts and full article texts. When a client quali es for multiple roles, the SSA can take one of several actions. First, the policy may specify a priority between roles; for example, a client eligible to read the full text of the Record should never be treated as a member of the general public. This prioritization may guarantee that a client is eligible for at most one role. Second, the PSA may have requested a speci c role or roles along with its request for service, and that can be used to help narrow down the set of eligible roles. As a third option, the application may be willing to accept a set of roles along with a request for service, and treat the client accordingly. More often, the SSA will need to assign the client to a single role. If the application has no explicit knowledge of roles, a wrapper may need to be written for it that applies the role knowledge appropriately (e.g., by using a certain database user name and password preassigned to all requests in that role, or by invoking the application with certain options). In simple cases, it may su ce to invoke the application if the client's role is quali ed to access it, and return an error to the client's PSA otherwise. For example, when browsing the Record, there is no separate application program; the Web server itself returns the requested documents. Thus if the client quali es for a role that is permitted to access the requested document, then the SSA should pass the request on to the server. If the client does not qualify, then the SSA should pass to the Web server an error response intended for the PSA, along with a copy of the relevant policy.
The SSA's knowledge base describing the server's credential acceptance policy consists of several sections. One describes the classi cation of requests into categories (equivalence classes), much as clients categorize service requests to simplify policy speci cation. All requests in a given category share the same security policy, simplifying speci cation of the policy. Another section of the knowledge base shows which roles are suitable for which kinds of requests. A nal section describes the application's policy on which credentials are required for which roles. The policy spells out exactly what credential types and issuers are acceptable for each role, so that the SSA can recognize a wide variety of related credential-sets, and conclude from any of them that the bearer is entitled to the types of access pertaining to the corresponding role(s). For example, if Mary submits an ACM membership credential with membership class`student', the SSA's policy may also require her to prove that she is currently enrolled in an accredited institution of higher learning. It would be impractical for the SSA's policy to list all such institutions explicitly. Instead, the policy can require her to submit her current student credential, issued by, say, the University of Illinois. In addition, the policy can require Mary to submit a credential issued by a national accreditation authority, stating that the University of Illinois is accredited. The policy then need only explicitly list the acceptable accreditation authorities.
To ascertain that the client making the request possesses the identity mentioned in a submitted credential, the server will often require the client to authenticate to one of the identities mentioned in the credential. For example, Sue will probably have to prove that she really is the individual whose ACM number is listed on her submitted ACM credential. Authentication can be accomplished using current well-known techniques and software, ranging from the primitive (and insecure) approach of supplying a password, through more modern public/private key approaches such as PEM 6] and PGP 13] . Since credential issuers may refer to the same client by di erent names, the client may have to authenticate to multiple identities when trying to use the credentials. For example, if Ann has joint ACM-IEEE membership, the SSA's policy will require her to authenticate to both her ACM and her IEEE identity (membership number).
Another facet of reasoning about credentials involves determining whether the validity dates on submitted credentials are appropriate for the request being made. For simple policies, the SSA can simply determine whether the expiration date given on the credential has already passed. For more complex policies, the SSA may need to have a deeper understanding of the notion of time, so that it can reason about validity intervals attached to statements. For example, an SSA might someday need to determine whether Sue has ever been a member of ACM and of IEEE at the same time.
One can imagine policies that are not readily enforceable, by considering examples involving the use of negation. For example, a friend of one of the authors once purchased a house that could not be sold to the Methodist Church. In order to carry out that transaction on line, a client would have to prove that none of his or her identities was that of the Methodist Church. Such a requirement is impractical and unenforceable. As a more practical example, consider a US-based service to sell guns on the internet. By law, purchasers cannot be convicted felons. One (foolish) way to express this requirement would be to say that if a client presents a credential proving that he or she is a convicted felon, the purchase must not be permitted. Then a client need only omit the o ending credential to complete the purchase. A more sensible treatment of negation would, in this example, require the purchaser to prove that he or she is not a convicted felon, by producing the appropriate good-conduct credential from his or her local police o ce (as is done today during the adoption process). This is not to say that negation has no place in a credential acceptance policy; for example, the SIGMOD Record's policy might state that article abstracts are available to all ACM members except institutional members. The distinguishing feature in this case is that to gain access, the client must present a certain credential C, and the negative prohibitions apply to certain aspects of C. Unlike the gun example, if the client omits C entirely, the client will be denied access. Similarly, a prohibition may apply to a certain combination of credentials (e.g., all clients must be over 18, and Texas residents must be over 21).
A PSA will at times need an explanation of the server's security policy, for example, on rst access. The SSA could send the PSA a copy of the policy, written in the export language for knowledge representation. However, much of the policy might not be of interest to the PSA, and furthermore the SSA might not be willing to share its entire policy. For example, the SSA might not be willing to admit the existence of certain categories of service or of certain roles to just anyone. In this case, the SSA can have planned in advance what information it is willing to share with what kinds of clients. For example, American Airlines may have one version of their policy they give to non-frequent iers, and another for frequent iers. The frequent iers may know that meal selection is available for gold iers, while non-frequent iers may not learn about the meal selection service at all. When a client requests an explanation, or when the SSA must deny a request and hence wishes to return an explanation to the PSA, the SSA can use the credentials attached to the request to determine what portion and version of its knowledge base it is willing to share with this particular client and service request. The only constraint is that the extracted portion of the knowledge base be partially consistent with the actual knowledge base, in the sense that if the PSA reasons with the extract and determines that a particular set of credentials will lead to authorization of a request, then that conclusion should be correct. Otherwise, the client will quickly realize that the SSA has lied about its security policy, and will be unable to determine which sets of credentials should be submitted.
Current Research Directions
Our focus during the past year was on the elaboration of the di erent functions which a PSA and SSA must perform (described above), and on the development of a testbed implementation of the PSA and SSA. The testbed prototype implements the PSA as a personal proxy and the SSA as a CGI script; it can be viewed through the project Web site, http://drl.cs.uiuc.edu/security/. All publications related to the digital credentials project are also available at the Web site.
A number of research issues remain for the project to address. Primary among them is the question of scalability of the design and implementation of the PSA. The prototype is being used only in a small application; how can the approach, and especially the user interface, be scaled to handle the large number of documents that a typical Web user may access?
Another important scalability question relates to the knowledge base of the SSA, and the extracts it shares with PSAs. How can the knowledge base be constructed in a modular fashion, to allow easy extraction? What theoretical requirement should we impose on extracts, so that conclusions drawn from them will be reasonably correct? How can ontology conventions be made, so that a PSA can make sense of a new server's policy? Will multiple standard languages for policy interchange be required? What if di erent servers use di erent inference approaches|can PSAs adapt to this, and mimic the reasoning of di erent SSAs in a manner that integrates well with their own reasoning? Functionality enhancements might also be needed in a real deployment of digital credentials. How can a PSA be beefed up to be a better assistant to the human, e.g., by better ability to mimic the reasoning of an SSA, by improving its ability to analyze failed requests for service and recommend actions, by teaching it how to help in procuring credentials, or by allowing the client to express more complex and subtle policies on which credentials can be sent to which servers? What design aids can be o ered to programmers who must create SSAs?
We are also investigating the use of digital credentials to increase the possibilities for interaction between heterogeneous services. For example, mediators and brokers may be available to help clients nd relevant information sources and fuse information derived from those sources. A broker's choice of sources to recommend to a client should depend on the security policies of the sources and the credentials possessed by the client. How can one summarize and distill such policies? A mediator faces additional challenges: it may not be trusted by the information source or by the client, yet it may have valuable services that the client would like to use. How can an untrusted mediator be integrated into an environment where client and server are able, through the use of digital credentials, to enter into a trusted relationship? Information ow from personal security assistant to server security assistant, for an example request for service. The request originates with a human, and is matched against the human's stated policies for credential submission, the target server's policies for credential acceptance, and the credentials the client currently possesses. The output is a set of the client's credentials which are attached to the request for service and forwarded to the server. After authentication, the server's security assistant matches the submitted credentials and the current request against its policy on credential acceptance. The output is a set of roles, which a wrapper can convert into an authorization decision that is intelligible to the application from which the client has requested service.
